A handful of recent cryptographic proposals rely on the conjectured hardness of the following problem in cyclotomic rings: given a basis of an ideal that is guaranteed to have a "rather short" generator, find such a generator. In the past year, Bernstein and Campbell-Groves-Shepherd have sketched potential attacks against this problem. Most notably, the latter authors claimed a quantum polynomial-time algorithm (alternatively, replacing the quantum component with an algorithm of Biasse and Fieker would yield a classical subexponential-time algorithm). A key claim of Campbell et al. is that one step of their algorithm-namely, decoding the log-unit lattice of the ring to recover a short generator from an arbitrary one-is efficient (whereas the standard approach takes exponential time). However, very few convincing details were provided to substantiate this claim, and as a result it has met with some skepticism.
Introduction
In recent years, lattices have emerged as an attractive foundation for cryptography. The most efficient (and potentially practical) lattice-based cryptosystems are related to ideal lattices, which correspond to ideals in certain families of rings, e.g., Z[X]/(X 2 k + 1). Representative works include [HPS98, Mic02, LMPR08, Gen09, LPR10] .
In recent years, several cryptographic constructions have relied directly on principal ideals that have "relatively short" generators, which serve as secret keys. 1 These include a variant of Gentry's original fully homomorphic encryption scheme [Gen09] due to Smart and Vercauteren [SV10] , the closely related Soliloquy encryption scheme [CGS14] , and candidate cryptographic multilinear maps [GGH13, LSS14] . Breaking these systems is no harder than solving the following problem, which we call the Short Generator of a Principal Ideal Problem (SG-PIP): given some Z-basis of an ideal that is guaranteed to have a "short" generator g, find a sufficiently short one (not necessarily g itself).
In the past year, warnings about SG-PIP in certain rings have been issued by Bernstein [Ber14a] and Campbell, Groves, and Shepherd [CGS14] , who sketched potential attacks. The basic structure of the attacks, which appears to be folklore in computational number theory, consists of two main parts:
• First, given a Z-basis of the principal ideal, find some arbitrary (not necessarily short) generator of the ideal. For this task, which is known as the Principal Ideal Problem (PIP), the state of the art is an algorithm of Biasse and Fieker [BF14, Bia14] , whose runtime has only a subexponential 2 n 2/3+ dependence on n, the degree of the ring (over Z). In addition, building on the recent work of Eisenträger et al. [EHKS14] , polynomial-time quantum algorithms for PIP have recently been described in two independent works [CGS14, BS15] , the latter of which provides a fully rigorous treatment. (In this work, we will not be further concerned with algorithms for PIP.)
• Second, transform the generator found in the previous phase into a short generator, thereby recovering the secret key, or its functional equivalent. The standard approach casts this task as a closest vector problem (CVP) on the Dirichlet "log-unit" lattice. In general, the fastest known algorithm for CVP (even allowing quantum) runs in exponential 2 Ω(n) time [MV10] , or in less time but with much weaker guarantees on the solution quality (e.g., [LLL82, Bab85, Sch87] ). Note that it is not obvious a priori whether this approach yields a sufficiently short generator; much depends on the geometry of the log-unit lattice and the quality of the CVP solution.
Recently, a more refined view of the second phase has emerged, centered around the kinds of rings and short generators typically suggested for cryptographic applications. In [Ber14a] , Bernstein suggests an approach that may yield slightly subexponential runtimes in cyclotomic rings of highly smooth index (e.g., m = 3 · 5 · 7 · 11). In addition, several researchers have noted that the CVP instances arising in the second phase have some implicit structure. For example, [CGS14, Ber14b] observe that the existence of a "rather short" generator (by choice of the secret key) implies that the target point is "somewhat close" to the log-unit lattice; CVP with such a distance guarantee is more commonly known as bounded-distance decoding (BDD). Previously, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13] gave an improved variant of the GentrySzydlo algorithm [GS02] which shows that in cyclotomic rings having power-of-two index, BDD on the log-unit lattice is efficiently solvable to within sub-polynomial n − log log n distance. However, this threshold is much too small to handle the BDD instances arising in cryptosystems.
Notably, the work of Campbell, Groves and Shepherd [CGS14] contains a surprising claim: that in cyclotomic rings having power-of-two index, the second phase described above is easy, simply by decoding the log-unit lattice using an LLL-reduced basis. The stated reason is that the secret generator corresponds to a vector that is short relative to the determinant of the log-unit lattice. However, no further details were given in [CGS14] , and as a result the claim has met with some skepticism. A main concern is whether an LLL-reduced basis is of high enough quality to enable efficient recovery of a sufficiently short generator.
Contribution. In this work, we give a rigorous theoretical and practical confirmation of the above-described claim from [CGS14] , for cyclotomics of prime-power index. Our central message is that by using a particular easy-to-compute lattice basis-but not necessarily an arbitrary LLL-reduced one, which can have vastly lower quality-the second phase succeeds with high probability for typical distributions of the secret short generator.
In more detail, we provide two main technical contributions. First, we use standard tools from analytical number theory, such as bounds on Dirichlet L-series, to elucidate the geometry of a canonical set of generators for the group of cyclotomic units. (The cyclotomic units correspond either to the log-unit lattice itself, or to a sublattice whose index is conjectured to be quite small, which is sufficient for our purposes.) Then we show that for a wide class of typical distributions of the secret generator-e.g., Gaussian-like distributions-a standard, efficient lattice-decoding algorithm recovers the secret short generator, given any generator of the ideal. Somewhat counterintuitively, the variance of the distribution is essentially irrelevant, because it is implicitly normalized by working with the log-unit lattice. Finally, to complement these results, we also give concrete numerical data demonstrating that this part of the attack succeeds for practical choices of dimension.
Discussion. Combining our results with known algorithms for PIP (which are the bottleneck in the full attack) [BF14, Bia14, CGS14, BS15] , one obtains quantum polynomial-time, or classical 2 n 2/3+ -time, keyrecovery algorithms for the cryptographic constructions of [SV10, GGH13, CGS14] . 2 An important open problem is to obtain even faster (classical) PIP algorithms, perhaps also using the guarantee that a short generator exists.
The overall attack is quite specialized to the specific combination of principal ideals having "rather short" generators, in cyclotomic number fields. In particular, it does not seem to apply to the approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) on arbitrary ideals. The conjectured hardness of approx-SVP is the foundation of the ring-LWE problem [LPR10] , which in turn is the heart of many ideal-lattice-based cryptosystems. The attack fails on approx-SVP because most ideals in cyclotomic rings are not principal, and moreover, most principal ideals do not have short generators (as compared with their shortest nonzero elements). An interesting and important question is whether these barriers can be overcome to attack SVP on arbitrary ideals, or ring-LWE. In a complementary direction, another interesting question is whether the attack on SG-PIP can be extended to other families of non-cyclotomic rings, such as those suggested in [Ber14a] . For this it may suffice to find (by analysis, computation, or both) a suitably good basis of the log-unit lattice, or of a sublattice of not too large index. canonical scalar product over R n and over C n is denoted ·, · , and · denotes the Euclidean norm. For a complex number z ∈ C, z denotes its complex conjugate, and |z| = √ z · z denotes its magnitude.
Lattices and BDD
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of R n for some positive integer n. The minimum distance of L is λ 1 (L) := min v∈L\{0} v , the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector. Every lattice is generated as the integer linear combinations of some (non-unique) R-linearly independent basis vectors B = {b 1 , .
where k ≤ n is called the rank of the lattice. Letting span denote the R-linear span of a set, the dual basis
for all j, j , where the Kronecker delta δ j,j = 1 if j = j , and is 0 otherwise. In other words, B t · B ∨ = (B ∨ ) t · B is the identity matrix.
In this work we deal with a computational problem on lattices called bounded-distance decoding (BDD): given a lattice basis B ⊂ R n of L = L(B) and a target point t ∈ span(L) with the guarantee that min v∈L v − t ≤ r for some known r < λ 1 (L)/2, find the unique v ∈ L closest to t (i.e., such that v − t ≤ r). In fact, in our context B and r will be fixed in advance, and t is the only input that may vary.
A standard approach to solve BDD (and related problems) is the "round-off" algorithm of [Bab85] , which simply returns B · (B ∨ ) t · t , where the rounding function c := c + 1 2 ∈ Z is applied to each coordinate independently. (Notice that (B ∨ ) t · t is the coefficient vector of t with respect to basis B.) We recall the following standard fact about this algorithm, and include a brief proof for completeness.
Claim 2.1. Let L ⊂ R n be a lattice with basis B, and let
2 ) for all j, then on input t and basis B, the round-off algorithm outputs v.
Proof. Because v = Bz for some integer vector z, we have (B ∨ ) t · t = z + (B ∨ ) t · e, so by hypothesis on the b j , e , we have (B ∨ ) t · t = z. The claim follows.
Circulant Matrices
We recall some standard facts about circulant matrices for a finite abelian group (G, ·), and their relationship with the characters of the group. See, e.g., see [Lan02] for further details and proofs.
Definition 2.2 (Circulant matrix).
For a vector a = (a g ) g∈G indexed by G, the G-circulant matrix associated with a is the G-by-G matrix whose (i, j)th entry is a ij −1 .
Note that the transpose of any G-circulant matrix (associated with (a g ) g∈G ) is also a G-circulant matrix (associated with (a g −1 ) g∈G ).
Definition 2.3 (Character group).
A character is a group homomorphism χ :
is the set of characters of G, with the group operation being the usual multiplication of functions, i.e.,
A basic fact is that |Ĝ| = |G|. Notice that for a character χ ∈Ĝ, we have χ(g) = χ(g) −1 = χ(g −1 ). We identify χ with the vector (χ(g)) g∈G . Then all characters χ have Euclidean norm χ = |G|, because
Moreover, distinct characters χ, ψ are orthogonal:
Therefore, the complex G-by-Ĝ matrix
is unitary, i.e., P −1 G = P * G , the conjugate transpose of P G .
Lemma 2.4. A complex matrix A is G-circulant if and only theĜ-by-Ĝ matrix P −1 G · A · P G is diagonal; equivalently, the columns of P G are the eigenvectors of A. If A is the G-circulant matrix associated with a = (a g ) g∈G , its eigenvalue corresponding to χ ∈Ĝ is λ χ = a, χ = g∈G a g · χ(g).
It follows that every row and column of A has squared Euclidean norm
It also follows that A −1 (when defined) is G-circulant, with eigenvalue λ −1 χ for eigenvector χ.
Proof. Suppose that A is G-circulant, and let χ ∈Ĝ be a character of G. Then
where in the final equality we have substituted k = gh −1 and used
For the other direction, it suffices by linearity to show that
G is G-circulant for every χ ∈Ĝ, where D χ is the diagonalĜ-by-Ĝ matrix with 1 in its (χ, χ)th entry and zeros elsewhere. Indeed, by definition of P G and because P −1
, which depends only on ij −1 as required.
Dirichlet Characters and L-Series
A Dirichlet character χ is a character of Z * k for some positive integer k. Note that if k| then χ induces a character of Z * via the natural homomorphism Z * → Z * k , so we can equivalently view χ as being defined modulo either k or . The conductor f χ of χ is the smallest positive f such that χ is induced by a Dirichlet character modulo f . The character is said to be even if χ(−1) = 1; note that the even Dirichlet characters correspond with the characters of Z * k /{±1}. We often implicitly extend χ to a completely multiplicative function from Z to C, by letting χ(a) = 0 if gcd(a, k) > 1.
For any Dirichlet character χ, the series L(s, χ) is absolutely convergent for all s ∈ C with (s) > 1. It is also known that L(1, χ) converges and is nonzero for any nontrivial Dirichlet character (i.e., χ = 1). We have the following asymptotic bounds on its value.
Theorem 2.6. There exists a real constant C > 0 such that, for any character χ of conductor f > 1,
The above result can be traced back to Landau [Lan27] , and improving the constant C is an active field of research [Lou15] . Additionally, under the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, the above bound can be improved to (f ) = C ln ln f (see [YXK13] ).
Cyclotomic Number Fields and the Log-Unit Lattice
Cyclotomic number fields. Let L be a field. An element ζ ∈ L is a root of unity if ζ m = 1 for some positive integer m. The order of a root of unity ζ ∈ L is the order of the finite multiplicative subgroup of L * generated by ζ. A primitive mth root of unity in L is a root of unity ζ ∈ L of order m. Note that if ζ ∈ L is a primitive mth root of unity, then the polynomial
Also note that the complete set of primitive mth roots in L consists of the powers ζ j for j ∈ Z * m . An algebraic number field K is a field of characteristic zero such that its dimension [K : Q] as a Q-vector space (i.e., its degree) is finite. If Ω ⊃ K is an extension field such that Ω is algebraically closed over Q, then there are exactly [K : Q] field embeddings of K into Ω. 3 An algebraic number field is Galois if the order of its automorphism group equals its degree. 4 A number field K is cyclotomic if K = Q(ζ) for some root of unity ζ ∈ K. Its degree is ϕ(m), where ϕ(·) is the Euler totient function and m is the order of ζ, and its ring of integers R is monogenic, i.e., R = Z[ζ]. We let U denote the cyclic (multiplicative) subgroup of mth roots of unity, which is generated by ζ.
A cyclotomic number field is Galois. If K = Q(ζ) is a cyclotomic number field with ζ ∈ K an mth primitive root of unity then each automorphism is characterized by the assignment ζ → ζ j for some j ∈ Z * m . As a consequence, if L is an extension field of a cyclotomic field K, then K is situated uniquely in L. For concreteness, we situate cyclotomic number fields in the complex numbers C. Let m be a positive integer and define ω = ω m = exp(2πı/m) ∈ C. Then ω is a primitive mth root of unity and K = Q(ω) is the mth cyclotomic number field. The embeddings of K into the complex numbers (i.e., the automorphisms of K) are denoted σ j for j ∈ Z * m , where σ j sends ω to ω j .
Logarithmic embedding. The embeddings σ i of K, being complex, come in conjugate pairs, i.e., σ j (x) = σ −j (x). We will mainly be concerned with their magnitudes, so we identify the pairs by indexing over the multiplicative quotient group G := Z * m /{±1}. We then have the logarithmic embedding, defined as
The logarithmic embedding defines a group homomorphism, mapping the multiplicative group K * to an additive subgroup of R ϕ(m)/2 . The kernel of Log restricted to R * is {±1} · U . The Dirichlet Unit Theorem (see [Sam70, Chapter 4.4, Theorem 1]) implies that Λ = Log(R * ), the image of the multiplicative unit group of R under the logarithmic embedding, is a full-rank lattice in the linear subspace of R ϕ(m)/2 orthogonal to the all-1s vector 1. We refer to Λ as the log-unit lattice.
Cyclotomic units. Let A be the multiplicative subgroup of K * generated by ±ζ and
Notice that z j = −ζ j · z −j , so z j and z −j are equivalent modulo ±U ; in particular, Log(z j ) = Log(z −j ). The group of cyclotomic units, denoted C, is defined by
The z j given above are not necessarily units in R, and thus do not generate C. However, a closely related generating set, which we call the canonical generators, is given by the following lemma. Recall that G = Z * m /{±1}, and identify it with some canonical set of representatives in Z * m . Lemma 2.7 (Lemma 8.1 of [Was97] ). Let m be a prime power, and define b j := z j /z 1 = (ζ j − 1)/(ζ − 1). The group C of cyclotomic units is generated by ±ζ and b j for j ∈ G \ {1}.
Notice that Log C is a sublattice of Λ. As shown below, the index of Λ over Log C is finite. In fact, it is h + (m), the class number of the real subfield K + = Q(ζ +ζ), defined as the index of the subgroup of principal fractional ideals in the multiplicative group of all fractional ideals (in K + ). The proof of this theorem is left as Exercise 8.5 in [Was97] . For completeness, we sketch the solution in Appendix B.
Theorem 2.8. For a prime power m > 2, the index of the log-unit lattice Λ over Log C is
Some facts and conjectures concerning h + . For our purposes, we need h + (m) not to be very big. For all power-of-two m up to m = 256, and also for m = 512 under GRH, it is known that h + (m) = 1 (see [Mil14a] ). Whether h + (m) = 1 for all power-of-two m is known as Weber's class number problem, and is presented in the literature as a reasonable conjecture. In the case of odd primes, it also appears that h + is quite small. Computations of Schoof [Sch03] and Miller [Mil14b] show that h + (p) ≤ 11 for all primes p ≤ 241. For powers of odd primes it has been conjectured (with support of the Cohen-Lenstra heuristic) that, for all but finitely many pairs (p, ) where p is a prime, h + (p +1 ) = h + (p ) [BPR04] . A direct consequence is that h + (p ) is bounded for a fixed p and increasing .
Geometry of the Canonical Generators
Throughout this section, let the cyclotomic index m be a prime power. Our goal here is to show that the canonical generators of the cyclotomic units, under the logarithmic embedding, are geometrically well-suited for bounded-distance decoding.
Recalling that G = Z * m /{±1} is identified with some set of canonical representatives in Z * m and that Log(b j ) = Log(b −j ), define
to be the log-embeddings of the canonical generators b j = (ζ j − 1)/(ζ − 1) defined in Lemma 2.7. By Lemma 2.7, these b j form a basis of the sublattice Log C, which by Theorem 2.8 has index h + (m) in Λ.
In order to apply the round-off algorithm and Claim 2.1 with this basis, we bound the norms b ∨ j of the dual basis vectors. The remainder of this section is dedicated to proving the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let m = p k for a prime p, and let {b ∨ j } j∈G\{1} denote the basis dual to {b j } j∈G\{1} . Then all b ∨ j are equal, and b
To prove the theorem we start by relating the basis vectors b j to a certain G-circulant matrix. Recalling that z j = ζ j − 1 is the numerator of b j , define z j := Log(z j ) = b j + z 1 . Collect these vectors into a square G-by-G matrix Z whose jth column is z j −1 , and notice that its (i, j)th entry log|ω i·j −1 − 1| is determined by ij −1 ∈ G alone, so Z is the G-circulant matrix associated with z 1 . For each eigenvector χ ∈Ĝ of Z, let λ χ := z 1 , χ denote the corresponding eigenvalue.
Lemma 3.2. For all j ∈ G \ {1} we have
Proof. Let z ∨ j denote the vectors dual to the z j , i.e., the columns of Z −t . (As shown below in the proof of Theorem 3.1, Z −1 is indeed well defined because all eigenvalues λ χ of Z are nonzero. ) We first claim that b ∨ j is simply the projection of z ∨ j orthogonal to 1, i.e.,
Indeed, these vectors are all in span(b j ) j , the space orthogonal to 1, and moreover, for all j, j ∈ G \ {1} they satisfy z
Recall by Lemma 2.4 that Z −t is the G-circulant matrix associated with z ∨ 1 , which has eigenvalue λ −1 χ = z 
For completeness, we briefly explain how the finite sum on the left hand side gives rise to an L-series, and refer to [Was97] for the details. Using the Taylor expansion
one gets a sum over finitely many a and infinitely many k of terms χ(a) · ω ak f /k. For a fixed k, the sum over a can easily be rewritten as τ (χ) · χ(k)/k, where τ (χ) is a Gauss sum (see [Was97, Lemma 4.7] ), which makes the Dirichlet L-function apparent. Proof. Let φ : Z * m → Z * f be the map given by reduction modulo f . We have
where in the last equality we have used the identity i∈Zn (1 − ω i n Y ) = 1 − Y n and ω n m = ω f with n = m/f . The claim follows by applying Theorem 3.3.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Recall that the characters χ ∈Ĝ correspond to the even characters of Z * m , because χ(±1) = 1. Also recall that by Lemma 2.4, the eigenvalues are
where the second equality holds because |1 − ω −a m | = |1 − ω a m |. Therefore, using Corollary 3.4 and Theorem 2.6, we have
.
Hence, by Lemma 3.2,
where the last inequality follows from Claim 3.5 below.
Proof. Notice that there are at most f Dirichlet characters of conductor f , at most half of which are even (when f > 1), so
Algorithmic Implications
The following is our main algorithmic result, showing that under mild restrictions on the distribution of the short generator, we can recover it from any generator that differs from it by a unit in C.
Theorem 4.1. Let D be a distribution over Q(ζ) with the property that for any unit vectors v 1 , . . . , v ϕ(m)−1 that are orthogonal to the all-1 vector, the probability that | Log(g), v i | < cm 1/2 log −3/2 m holds for all i is at least some α > 0, where g is chosen from D and c is a universal constant. There is an efficient algorithm that given g = g · u, where g is chosen from D and u ∈ C is a cyclotomic unit, outputs an element of the form ±ζ j g with probability at least α.
Proof. The algorithm applies the roundoff algorithm from Claim 2.1 to Log(g ) = Log(g) + Log(u). By the assumption on D and Theorem 3.1, with probability at least α the output is Log(u) ∈ Log(C). We next find integer coefficients a j such that Log(u) = a j b j , and compute u = b a j j . Since Log(u ) = Log(u) it follows that u must be of the form ±ζ j u for some sign and some j. Therefore, g /u is the desired element.
In the next section we show that the condition on D in the theorem is satisfied by several natural distributions.
One possible concern with the above algorithm is that it expects as input g · u for a cyclotomic unit u ∈ C, whereas the first phase of the attack described in the introduction, i.e., a PIP algorithm, is only guaranteed to output g · u for an arbitrary unit u ∈ R * . There are several reasons why this should not be an issue. First, as mentioned in Section 2, in some cases, e.g., for power-of-2 cyclotomic, it is conjectured that C = R * . More generally, the index of C in R * , which we recall is h + , the class number of the totally real subfield, is often small. In such a case, if we have a list of coset representatives of C in R * , we can enumerate over all of them and use the algorithm above to recover g, increasing the running time only by a factor of h + . In order to obtain such a list of representatives, we can use an algorithm for computing the unit group, either classical [BF14] or quantum [EHKS14] . These algorithms are no slower than the known PIP algorithms and moreover, need only be applied once for a given cyclotomic field (as opposed to once for each public key). Alternatively, by running the PIP algorithm multiple times on a basis of a principal ideal with a known short generator chosen using the secret key generation algorithm, we can recover a list of representatives for all the cosets that show up as output of the PIP algorithm with non-negligible probability; we can then enumerate over that list.
Tail Bounds
In this section we show that the condition on D in Theorem 4.1 is satisfied by two natural distributions: the continuous Gaussian and a wide enough discrete Gaussian (over any lattice). This section is independent of the other sections in this paper, and we avoid the use of notation from algebraic number theory. Instead, we identify elements of K with vectors in R ϕ(m) by taking the real and the imaginary part of their ϕ(m)/2 complex embeddings, i.e., a is mapped to ( (σ j (a)), (σ j (a))) j∈G . The results in this section should be easy to extend to other distributions.
We start with Lemma 5.2, a tail bound on the sum of subexponential random variables. The proof is based on a standard Bernstein argument, and follows the proof in [Ver12] apart from some minor modifications for convenience.
Definition 5.1. For α, β > 0, we say that a random variable X is (α, β)-subexponential if
where recall that cosh(x) := (e x + e −x )/2. Lemma 5.2 (Tail bound). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent centered (i.e., expectation zero) (α, β)-subexponential random variables. Then, for any a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ R n and every t ≥ 0,
Proof. By scaling, we can assume without loss of generality that α = 1. Next, we use the inequality
which holds for all −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and all x ∈ R, where the second inequality follows from the Taylor expansion. By applying this inequality to a (1, β)-subexponential centered random variable X, and taking expectations we see that for all −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
Using Markov's inequality, we can bound the upper tail probability for any λ > 0 as
where in the second inequality we used (2) and assumed that λ a ∞ ≤ 1. Taking λ = min(t/(4β a 2 2 ), 1/ a ∞ ) this bound becomes at most
We complete the proof by applying the same argument with −a.
The next claim follows immediately from Definition 5.1. The following is an immediate corollary of the tail bound. It shows that the condition in Theorem 4.1 holds with overwhelming probability for a continuous Gaussian distribution of any radius that is spherical in the embedding basis. Notice that the parameter r plays no role in the conclusion of the statement.
Lemma 5.4. Let X 1 , . . . , X n , X 1 , . . . , X n be i.i.d. N (0, r) variables for some r > 0, and letX i = (X 2 i + X 2 i ) 1/2 . Then, for any unit vectors a (1) , . . . , a ( ) ∈ R n that are orthogonal to the all-1 vector, and every t ≥ C for some universal constant C,
Proof. By union bound, it suffices to prove the lemma for the case = 1, and we let a = a (1) . Since a i = 0, we can assume without loss of generality that r = 1. Notice thatX i has a chi distribution with 2 degrees of freedom (also known as a Rayleigh distribution) whose density function is given by xe −x 2 /2 for x > 0 and zero otherwise. In particular, it is easy to see that both E[X i ] and E[X −1 i ] are finite (both are π/2). Therefore, by Claim 5.3, logX i is (1, β) subexponential for some constant β > 0. From this it follows thatX i = logX i − E[logX i ] are centered (1, β ) subexponential random variables for some constant β > 0. The result now follows by applying Lemma 5.2 toX 1 , . . . ,X n , using the bound a ∞ ≤ 1, and the observation that i a i E[logX i ] = 0.
In the next lemma we show that small perturbations of the continuous Gaussian distribution still satisfy the condition in Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 5.5. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n , X 1 , . . . , X n ) be i.i.d. N (0, r) variables for some r > 0, and let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n , Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) be a (not necessarily independent) random vector satisfying Y 2 ≤ u with probability 1 for some u ≤ r/(20 √ n). Let Z = X + Y and defineX i ,Ŷ i ,Ẑ i as before. Then for any unit vectors a (1) , . . . , a ( ) ∈ R n that are orthogonal to the all-1 vector, it holds with constant probability that for all j,
Proof. By Lemma 5.4 we have that with some constant probability close to 1,
Moreover, sinceX i < r/(10 √ n) implies that both X i and X i are smaller than r/(10 √ n), we see that the probability of this event is at most c/n for some small constant c and as a result we have that with constant probability close to 1, ∀i,X i > r/(10 √ n) .
In the following we assume that these two conditions hold (which happens with constant probability close to 1 by union bound), and bound the effect of Y . Now let a be one of the unit vectors in the statement of the lemma. Then,
where we used Eq. (3). Notice that by the triangle inequality (for two-dimensional Euclidean space),
, and using the inequality | log(1 + δ)| ≤ 2|δ| valid for all
where the first inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz.
Finally, we consider the spherical (in the embedding basis) discrete Gaussian distribution over an arbitrary lattice L ⊆ R 2n . Such distributions show up often in cryptographic constructions (see, e.g., [LPR13] ), and often that lattice is the (embedding of the) ring of integers R. For background on the discrete Gaussian distribution and the smoothing parameter, see, e.g., [MR04] . In order to apply Lemma 5.5 to this distribution, take X to be the continuous Gaussian D r for some r ≥ 100nη ε (L), and Y the discrete Gaussian D L−X,s over the coset L − X of parameter s = η ε (L) for some negligible parameter ε. Using Banaszczyk's result [Ban93] we have that with all but exponentially small probability in n, Y 2 ≤ √ 2nη ε (L) ≤ r/(60 √ n). Moreover, by the lemma below, the distribution of Z = X + Y is within negligible statistical distance of the discrete Gaussian distribution D L,r for r = (r 2 + η ε (L) 2 ) 1/2 . We therefore see that the condition in Theorem 4.1 holds for the discrete Gaussian distribution D L,r for any lattice L and any r > 200nη ε (L).
Lemma 5.6 (Special case of [Pei10, Theorem 3.1]). Let L be a lattice and r, s > 0 be such that s ≥ η ε (L) for some ε ≤ 1/2. Then if we choose x from the continuous Gaussian D r and then choose y from the discrete Gaussian D L−x,s then x + y is within statistical distance 8ε of the discrete Gaussian D L,(r 2 +s 2 ) 1/2 .
A Numeric Data
The previous sections established asymptotic bounds related to the log-embeddings of the cyclotomic units. Here we give concrete numeric data for several practical (and even impractical) choices of cyclotomic fields. This data confirms that the method works in practice.
B Proof of Theorem 2.8
Proof. First, Corollary 4.13 of [Was97] gives that Z[ζ] * is generated by Z[ζ + ζ] * and ζ, so it follows that
since the kernel of Log is the group {±1} · U . Next, recall that the group of cyclotomic units is defined as C = A ∩ R * . We define the group of real cyclotomic units as C + = A ∩ Z[ζ +ζ] * . The analogue of Lemma 2.7 for the real cyclotomic units, also included in Lemma 8.1 of [Was97] , says that the group C + of real cyclotomic units is generated by −1 and ζ (1−j)/2 · b j . So as above, we obtain that 
